Vault dashboards lead with size and yield. This measures what appears withdrawable at the current state: per market, the smaller of what the vault supplied and what that market has left unlent, summed, read from Euler, Morpho and Lista.
50 days of the register, recorded daily, from 18 August 2026. That is short, and it is short because we started recording it then rather than because nothing happened before. This is a reading we took and stored rather than an event a chain kept, so the series itself begins when we began; the underlying activity may well be reconstructable from an archive node or the venue’s own history, and we have not done it.
An hour is not a scenario: it is what the register says is free now, with no model behind it. A day and a week add how fast each vault\u2019s own free liquidity has actually come back, taken from its own history in this register and never from a market-wide rate.
Waiting buys less than it sounds. The median vault\u2019s free liquidity grew by <0.01% a day over the register, and for half of all vault-days nothing came back at all. Over 481 vaults holding $8.33B, each with at least 14 days of its own history. A further 148 vaults holding $39.81M free are NOT in these figures: they have too little history here for a rate of their own, and the market median is not their history.
What is not here. Of 3,649 open vaults holding $11.34B, 2,809 holding $728.25M have no exit reading at all, neither what can be withdrawn nor what sits unlent. That is 6% of the capital on this site, and the figures above say nothing about it. The venues behind most of it are Concrete, Hyperliquid, ether.fi Liquid, Lagoon and Veda, where withdrawal is asynchronous or on a timer and the reading we have elsewhere does not apply.
All at once is less. Across the $7.51B we read market by market (Morpho and Lista), each vault on its own could take out $2.72B; if every one of them left together, the 232 markets they share would give up at most $965.54M, because $1.76B of free cash is counted once per vault that could claim it. Queue order, reallocation and withdrawal caps are not modelled: this is the free-cash ceiling, not a forecast.
A lending vault’s size and its liquidity are different facts. Venues show both for their own vaults; this page puts the liquidity side by side across every lending vault we read, which no single venue does. Utilisation here is computed from the two halves of one reading, lent out over lent out plus left, never against a capital figure written by another job at another time, which is a wrong number built from two right ones.
A vault absent from this list is one whose liquidity we do not read, never one with nothing locked. Where the reading is missing the site says so rather than showing a zero.
Every venue publishes what a vault holds. Who can move it is public too, on the vault contract, but few pages put it beside the size, and it is the shorter path to zero: a bad strategy loses money slowly and in public, an owner key does it in one transaction. Read from the vault contracts themselves, owner, curator, guardian, for every vault above $1M that answers those calls.
$1.28B sits in 46 vaults whose owner is a single externally-owned account with no guardian, nobody can veto what that key does. 57 other vaults of the 387 read keep owner, curator and guardian as separate parties, which is what makes this a choice rather than a limitation of the venue.
This covers the 387 vaults over $1M that answer an owner() call, and not the 39 holding $175.57M that do not. Those govern through a different interface, or reached us from an aggregator with no contract address attached, for them the question is open, not answered in their favour.
| Vault | Capital | What the contract says |
|---|---|---|
| Adpend USDC | $471.85M | the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change; the curator and the owner are the same address |
| 1337 USDC | $251.55M | the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change; no curator is set, the owner holds curation directly |
| Avant avUSD · SAVUSD |
| $104.84M |
| the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change; no curator is set, the owner holds curation directly |
| Galaxy USDC | $89.70M | the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change |
| Keyrock Prime USDC | $75.00M | the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change |
| Avant avETH · SAVETH | $28.18M | the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change; no curator is set, the owner holds curation directly |
| Lagoon · ROCK.RETH | $24.97M | the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change; no curator is set, the owner holds curation directly; upgradeable: a proxy admin can replace the contract |
| Flowdesk Confidential High Yield USDT | $19.87M | the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change |
| Bitwise Premium RWA AUSD | $17.43M | the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change |
| $16.75M | the owner is a single externally-owned account, not a multisig; no guardian, so no party can veto a timelocked change; the curator and the owner are the same address |